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Abstracts 
 
Introduction, a systemic problem for Westminster government: The systemic problem in 
Westminster government is political hyperactivity or ‘initiativitus’ rather than inaction. 
Ministers and permanent Officials are motivated to act decisively and be seen to be doing so. 
Drawing on expert testimony, it shows that tthere are a myriad of incentives principally being 
the political imperative to react, Ministerial ad Civil Servant short-termism, reshuffles and 
inter0governmental competition.  The research demonstrates that there are few structural 
incentives to do less of nothing.  
 
Chapter 1, why do nothing and who does it?: The section compares two core incentives for 
political inaction – ideological and resource.  It compares the experiences of two respective 
periods of government. The 1980s when the Thatcher administration was driven by an 
ideological belief in a smaller state and post credit crunch where after 2008 ministers were 
faced with a squeeze on public spending and promised pragmatically ‘more for less’. The 
research argues that small state ideology still meant ministerial hyperactivity and ultimately a 
stronger state.  Even the most significant post-war recession of international proportions 
including sovereign debt crises across the world did not seriously curtail the reach of 
government. In the context of the Westminster model, the section goes on to discuss how the 
professionalization of politicians means an unspoken consensus that limits what governments 
are prepared to do despite a political class committed to action,  
 
Chapter 2, why does do nothing politics matter?: Viewed through the prism of key historical 
episodes of the contemporary British political experience, this section takes a longitudinal 
approach to show that policy inaction has been crucial in securing significant social and 
economic change.  Taking as instances the decisions of those administrations to follow Attlee 
and Thatcher respectively, it argues that the legacies owe much to the inaction of political 
opponents to unwind change.  Elsewhere Harold Wilson’s policy on Vietnam and Tony Blair’s 
attitudes towards the European Single Currency demonstrate that ‘do nothing’ politics can be 
as significant as the active. Reflecting on Peter Hall’s concept of third order policy change, it 
suggests the possibility of an additional driver in ‘no order’ ‘change’.  
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Chapter 3, how is do nothing politics held to account?: By analysing the implications of the 
Westminster Model and its constitutional apparatus, this section argues that combative 
opposition with poor cooperation and minimal consensual discussion ensures government 
inaction across crucial policy areas. Democratic checks and balances, it is argued amount to a 
disincentive to take necessary but unpopular action.  Meanwhile mechanisms such as 
independent inquiries give the semblance of action but the ability to do nothing about given 
issues while Parliamentary Select Committees themselves create public interest and demand 
action of ministers.  By taking a longer view of spending commitments across a series of 
elections, it demonstrates that the Westminster system incentivises parties to match rather 
than depart from incumbents’ plans making such change largely incremental. Parliamentary 
government in Westminster can both incentivise inaction and provide the tools to ‘do nothing’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stephen Barber is Associate Professor in Public Policy at London South Bank University and a 
Senior Research Fellow at the Global Policy Institute.  
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Foreword 
 
As Prime Minister David Cameron put the final touches to the first majority Conservative 
government in eighteen years, a dividing line was drawn between the coalition he had led 
alongside the Liberal Democrats from 2010 and the single party administration formed with a 
slim majority in 2015.  It was not only the ‘quad’ that was gone; the formal mechanism for 
Conservatives David Cameron and George Osborne and Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg and 
Danny Alexander to meet in order to thrash out policy, strategy and governance issues.  Gone 
now was also a barrier to political action. 
Clegg’s power as Deputy Prime Minister was less the ability to instigate policy in government 
(though he was not entirely without such influence) than it was to stop policy.  His was 
ultimately the power of veto.  Bennister and Heffernan illustrate that Cameron remained the 
‘resource rich’ actor in the coalition1 but Clegg’s Liberal Democrats had what Matthews refers 
to as ‘watchdog’ powers to moderate and ultimately block policy2. 
As Cameron despatched his new Ministers to their departments clutching their policy briefs, he 
was naturally signalling the direction and priorities for the administration.  In looking forward, 
the episode demonstrated simultaneously that one crucial significance of the outgoing 
coalition’s record in office was not simply what it achieved in the course of five years but also 
what it did not do.  Alas, for all of Clegg’s attempts to convince voters of the preventative 
influence of his party, it was a point largely lost by the electorate which punished the Liberal 
Democrats at the 2015 polls. And yet here in the dawn of a new government committed to 
policies including repealing the Human Rights Act and introducing a Counter-Extremism Bill, 
political inaction can be seen to be a hugely important aspect of understanding the period.   
It is also a neat illustration of the importance of understanding the idea of political inaction, or 
‘do nothing’ policy.  And that is what this short book is committed to do.  Organised 
thematically, it explores political inaction in a number of guises examining its motivations, its 
legacy and the role played by the combative Westminster model in ensuring policy makers do 
nothing. By taking an historical perspective, it illustrates that this contemporary instance of 
inaction is not exceptional and that do nothing politics shapes the world we live in today.   
I would like to extend my thanks to the editors at Palgrave Macmillan for their enthusiasm 
about the project and their patience while it was delivered.  I would also like to acknowledge 
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the insightful comments of my two anonymous reviewers whose thought improved the 
research considerably.  
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Introduction – A Systemic Problem for Westminster 
Government 
 
There has to be a choice in policymaking.  Where there is no option, there is no decision and 
consequently an event cannot be legitimately described as a policy.  The ability to make choices 
is very often far more constrained than political actors would like to admit but nonetheless, 
every day decisions are made in government; some minor and administrative, others of great 
magnitude and import to many lives and lifestyles. The range of choices, though, includes a 
frequently overlooked option: do nothing.  
 In this sense policy involves negative preference as well as positive and gives rise to an early 
and oft reproduced definition of public policy offered by Thomas Dye back in 1972 as being 
‘what government chooses to do or not to do’3.  There is some limited coverage of the ‘not to 
do’ part of this description in the existing literature, but on the whole the topic is largely 
overlooked in favour of its more positive, active, brethren.  Michael Howlett’s excellent 
assessment of policy design4, public policy implementation appraised by Hill and Hupe as well 
as Taylor and Balloch’s edited volume on policy evaluation5 are good examples of academic 
attention to the (active) topic.  John encapsulates this approach in Analyzing Public Policy by 
describing the academic topic thus: ‘Research on public policy seeks to explain how decision 
makers, working within or close to the machinery of government and other political 
institutions, produce public actions that are intended to have an impact outside the political 
system. The subject focusses on the decisions that generate outputs…’6 
But policy can be seen at times as deliberate omission, that is the intentional act of not doing 
something and conscious of the implications.  Here there has also been a longstanding debate 
which is of relevance around the idea of policy making as an ‘incremental’ process7, often 
pragmatically conceived and based upon adjusting the status quo versus those who see it as 
essentially stable and ‘punctuated’ by bursts of radical change8.  There is a suggestion that 
radicalism means change in a way that pragmatism is more about adjustments and stability.  
But this raises questions about what is not done either in the case of incrementalism or indeed 
the opportunity cost of punctuating the equilibrium.  
And understanding this idea of political inaction is the prime focus of this short book.  
Concentrating on the experience of politics in Britain, the study is grounded in the 
constitutional apparatus of what has been termed the ‘Westminster Model’ of oppositional, 
parliamentary government to consider not only what politicians do but just as importantly, 
what they choose not to do.  
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As such, in what remains a relatively narrow focus, the book contributes to a literature wider 
than that around policy development.  The book draws in and adds to emerging academic 
debate on the professionalisation of politics, the nature of Westminster opposition and 
constitutional change.  In this sense, the idea of ‘do nothing’ politics is a conceptual lens 
through which it is possible to look afresh at some of these debates.   
Nonetheless, the distinct contribution of this book is to dissect the concept of ‘do nothing’ 
politics as defined here.  Its methodology is longitudinal, based on the practice of government 
in Britain and organised around three broad perspectives of the topic.  Firstly it explores the 
philosophical and practical reasons for inaction alongside the implications of professionalization 
of politics.  Secondly it steps back to set the subject in its historical context and to demonstrate 
the legacy of doing nothing given the seventy year experience of post war government.  Thirdly 
it considers how ‘doing nothing’ is and can be held to account by widening the study from the 
narrower actions of the executive to the more far-reaching functions of the Westminster 
Parliament.  Consequently the research addresses three big questions around these 
perspectives: what is ‘do nothing’ politics and who does it? Why does ‘do nothing’ politics 
matter? How is ‘doing nothing’ held to account in the Westminster system?  
The analysis in parts one and three is supplemented by interviews with three elite informants 
who have direct experience of the policy making process and its accountabilities. Peter Lilley9 
held posts in the Treasury during the Thatcher government and Cabinet positions at Social 
Security and Trade and Industry under John Major in the 1990s.  He was later Shadow 
Chancellor when the Conservatives went into opposition after 1997.  Latterly at the Institute for 
Government, Jill Rutter10 was a senior civil servant. With spells in the Treasury as 
Communications Director and in the Private Office, DEFRA and the Number 10 Policy Unit, she 
experienced the Thatcher, Major and Blair administrations.  Margaret Hodge11 was a Minister 
throughout the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, holding a variety of briefs from 
Disabled People, Universities, Children, Work and finally as Minister of State for Culture and 
Tourism.  But her most prominent role was perhaps upon leaving office when she became the 
elected and prominent Chair of the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee.  
The book makes the case that political inaction can be as significant as policy action and that 
doing nothing has shaped the politics and society recognizable today.  But it also demonstrates 
that to properly understand the significance of doing nothing in British politics, one has to 
appreciate the impact of the adversarial Westminster model which can be seen as the source of 
policy ‘hyperactivity’ as well as political inaction. Government actors are incentivised to be 
active and even doing less sometimes means doing more.  
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In an effort to demonstrate relevance from the research, a postscript is included which 
categorises some of the shortfalls in the political system highlighted by this publication and 
makes some modest recommendations for change.   
This book is far from comprehensive.  Viewing the topic at a conceptual level grounded in the 
political and historical record, the analysis presented is complete but, as always with this type 
of research, limited.  As such, this study is offered as an opening critique and represents an 
invitation to other scholars to contribute to the topic.  There already appears to be an emerging 
interest from academics in the broad subject area.  As this book was in its latter drafting stage, 
a working paper was published by Allan McConnell and Paul Hart. Public Policy as Inaction: the 
politics of doing nothing12, primarily tackles the definition and methodological issues with the 
topic but the research represents a useful guide to scholars tackling these questions.  Alas, it 
emerged too late to benefit this publication but will no doubt support future studies of this 
kind. 
Further research would explore the subject from within Whitehall itself, examine the historical 
practice in more detail by way of public records and accounts, or widen the terms to compare 
experiences across the democratic world.  That being said, this research is a self-contained 
critique of the ‘who, what and why’ of inaction in British politics.  Such an academic critique is 
made possible by the particular format represented by Palgrave’s Pivot publications.  A short 
book rather than a long article, the outcome is different to either the traditional monograph or 
journal publication and that has allowed for a more generous discussion than is possible in a 
narrow academic article without the grander, all-encompassing, demands of a book. Indeed, 
the format means that ‘Do Nothing’ is a focussed study which addresses a series of research 
questions but with an alacrity and pace otherwise unobtainable.  It has also provided a vehicle 
to draw together and link recently published research produced by the author around 
Westminster politics.  
It is in part the format which has allowed for this investigation into an important but 
overlooked area of academic inquiry. It is hoped the research will provoke discussion about the 
nature of the governance system, widen academic understanding of policy decision making, 
and inform the debate about practical reforms.  
Political inaction is wound up in our conceptions of power and just what politicians do when 
they win power.  Before settling on a definition of ‘do nothing’ politics, however, the remainder 
of this opening section will acknowledge the more often cited criticism of Westminster 
government: that it does too much. 
 
‘What are we going to do?’ The problem of ‘Political Initiativitus’ and the ‘Lilley Option’ 
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One possible reason for the under-exploration of political inaction is that the systemic problem 
would appear to be the contrary.  That is overwhelmingly the behaviour of politicians is to act 
and to be seen to act, comment and legislate across a range of policy areas.  What might be 
termed political ‘initiativitus’ not only sees governments extending their reach in areas which 
perhaps should not concern them, but more seriously the action can sometimes be counter-
productive.  That is doing nothing might have produced ‘better’ outcomes.   
Former BP Executive John Manzoni was appointed Chief Executive of the Civil Service in 
October 2014.  A month into his tenure he gave MPs his views on Whitehall.  Giving evidence to 
the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, he put it starkly: ‘We are doing 30% too 
much across the board anyway — we always have done…Too much activity. No company would 
undertake the level of transformative change that this Government have undertaken….We have 
to stop people having great ideas and everybody saying yes to them, I think.’13 But this is how 
democratic government works and how Ministers and Officials are incentivised to act.  The 
systemic problem is described by Peter Lilley when he reflected upon his first taste of 
government in the 1980s: 
 
In my first ever role of miniscule importance I was PPS to the Ministers for Local 
Government and I had the tremendous privilege of sitting in on ministerial meetings in 
the Department of the Environment.  I by and large kept quiet but I noticed after a while 
that there would be some problem, ministers would ask officials to come up with 
proposals and they would come up with proposals or for some reason proposals would 
emerge and I would see them.  There would be option one and two and three a, b, c and 
so on.  They would eventually decide that one of them was the best and after a while I 
ventured to suggest there was one option they had never considered and that was the 
option of doing nothing. So they then decided to put it on the agenda always and it 
became known as ‘Lilley’s Option’ and persisted for a while under that title for a while 
after I left.  And subsequently I became more aware of it when I became a minister 
myself that officials are goaded into action by Ministers or events or the newspapers or 
whatever and so they came up with proposals for change and there are two great 
problems.  One is it never occurs to them or anyone else that doing nothing may be the 
least bad option and two that ministers themselves are not necessarily terribly well 
aware of how the present system works.  Where it doesn’t work, you’ve got a problem 
but they don’t understand the mechanics of it.  But they will be told in great detail the 
mechanics of how the proposed alternative works14. 
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Here the democratic Westminster system, combined with the pressures of twenty four hour 
news cycle and social media, must take some of the blame for incentivising such behaviour.  
After all, parties forming new administrations bring swathes of plans and initiatives, many 
claiming the democratic mandate of the people.  Jill Rutter offers a subtly different perspective 
from the experience of the Civil Servants whose job it is to carry out the wishes of Ministers: 
 
I think there’s a bias to action. There’s the sense that a lot of policy comes out of the 
idea that ‘something must be done’… we have to act – the newspapers are baying for us 
we can’t just say ‘rubbish happens and the sensible thing is not to act’. I was in the Chief 
Secretary’s office in the Summer of Disasters in 1987 when we had the Piper Alpha 
explosion, we had the Hungerford Massacre. Mrs Thatcher wanted to give away money 
for everything. We were working out the, we’ve killed 50 people there so how much is 
that worth? And there were just a series of things where the reaction was always, go!... I 
remember having this argument with Number 10 over Hungerford and saying there are 
loads of murders, there is a thing called the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme. 
Just because one man went and murdered a load of people on one day doesn’t mean 
that we do something different…. The dynamic goes that a minister says I’m worried 
about X, I need to do something and then I think it’s quite a brave move for an official to 
contradict. Political advisers can say, ‘are you really sure?’,  but if you have relatively 
unconfident officials who aren’t sure of their relationship with ministers and who’ve 
been told that the Civil Service is blocking ministerial action and are a bunch of 
obstructionists then the moment  the minister says ‘something must be done’ or ‘I’m 
interested in X what should we do?’  then there’s a bias towards doing something15.  
 
This tension in Whitehall between Ministers and officials can be seen as a conduit for political 
action.  Civil Servants can be seen as reacting to the wishes of their elected masters even if their 
own instincts would be to think again.  Here are to actors incentivised to behave in different 
ways. Sometimes a minister is hyperactive because of inexperience of office and officials carry 
out their wishes because of a lack of political confidence to advise otherwise.  Reflecting on 
more than a decade holding various government portfolios below Cabinet rank, Margaret 
Hodge identifies a real systemic problem in the way Whitehall operates.  In part the incentives 
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that drive a Minister to act are coupled with limited preparedness for the job they have 
assumed: 
 
I was a minister for most of the Blair/Brown years and I only really got it in the last job. I 
knew we had a year left and I just set myself seven priorities; I set myself seven things to 
do this year and that’s it. And it was incredibly successful.  It’s not what most ministers 
do and that is what we ought to be supported into realising. You can only achieve a few 
priorities16. 
 
As Peter Hennessy put it in his study of Whitehall, governments ‘descend with manifestos, 
policy papers of varying degrees of sophistication and, in the case of more zealous new 
ministers, a conviction that some of the great intractables will at last yield to the force of 
correct policy and political will.’17 This leaves the Civil Service in a delicate position about 
whether they should challenge a new minister or even suggest doing less.  Jill Rutter, now at 
the think tank the Institute for Government, continues: 
 
One of the messages we give to oppositions is that they need to make it clear to Civil 
Servants that they are open for challenge early on because the first thing the civil 
service is trying to do is to overcome scepticisms and I’ll give you an example.  I was in 
the Treasury in 1997 when Gordon Brown came in. Our Permanent Secretary had been 
appointed as a monetarist by Margaret Thatcher – Terry Burns. Within three days 
Gordon Brown wanted to make the Bank of England independent- that was fine – but he 
also wanted to strip it of its banking supervisory powers.  Terry said you need to go 
more slowly on this, there are lots of issues – Eddie George the Governor won’t like it 
and we need to think carefully. That ended Terry’s career effectively he was 
marginalised for the next year because Gordon didn’t like anyone saying ‘no’ to him so 
the message goes out18. 
The position here no doubts constitutes sound advice but as a prerequisite puts the onus on the 
politician to invite dissent even when they have a worked out plan of action, a clear mandate 
and political authority.  Added to this could be the circumstances where they are unfamiliar 
with the workings of Whitehall.  Margaret Hodge counters the argument with a call for 
improvements in the quality of Civil Service advice arguing that at the top level there is a similar 
systemic motivation for Officials to act as there is for Ministers.   
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The only route to it would be a civil service which is much more skilled. One which has 
that sort of intelligence there at the heart of what they’re doing. I mean they are the 
same as the politicians at a senior level; they will make their reputations on initiatives 
rather than delivering more effectively on existing programmes. You need more 
confident, competent, independent civil servants willing to challenge and that would be 
a transformation of the civil service.19  
 
 While this is a clear problem for any early period of office, when headstrong new ministers 
meet permanent officials, the problem would not appear to dissipate with time.  Older 
governments feel the need to demonstrate they have not run out of steam.  A case in point was 
the final year of the 2010 Parliament which led up to a general election date known in advance 
for the first time because of the Fixed Term Parliament Act. The final Queen’s speech was 
legislatively light despite some later attempts to counter the damaging accusation that it was a 
‘Zombie Parliament’.  Nevertheless, it led Chief Whip Michael Gove to spring to its defence: 
‘When this parliament is dissolved – on March 30th’, he told an audience at the think tank Policy 
Exchange, ‘ we will have sat for 734 days, 16 more than in the 2005-10 parliament, 91 more 
than in the 1997-2001 parliament and 149 more than in the 2001-05 parliament. On average, 
we will have sat on more days per year in this parliament than either of the previous two. In 
this last session of Parliament – shorter than usual sessions because thanks to the fixed-term 
Parliament Act it only runs from June to March – we are busier than the last – much longer – 
session of the 2005-10 Parliament.’20 Here the defence of government represented not a 
record of accomplishments but rather a boast about the sheer volume of work it had 
undertaken. What this amounts to in the round is more activity, more initiatives. 
And within government there is competition between ministers for parliamentary time and 
financial resources which fuel action. The result is near constant reform of policy and public 
services with projects which will often never reach their conclusion before the emergence of 
another new initiative. Peter Lilley gives some sense of that competition: 
 
There is competition for resources in the normal sense of finance but there’s also 
competition for legislative time.  So if a department gets a Bill and it appears in the 
Queen’s Speech, that’s considered good and if it gets two Bills that appear in the 
Queen’s Speech that really puts it up the pecking order in Whitehall.  But no Bills is sad.  
When you do get a Bill – because you don’t get one every year – there’s a great 
temptation to put everything in it so it becomes a sort of portmanteau bill.  
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That competition for legislative time and space either encourages ministers to go for 
portmanteau bills that cover all sorts of problems the department thinks needs tackling 
and the minister may not even be aware of or to go for big bang solutions rather than to 
tweak the present system and make it work a bit better and if that doesn’t work go for 
something more radical. You say, ‘We’d better do it now or we might not get another 
Bill for another three years’21.  
This experience of intra-government competition also gives rise to a greater understanding of 
policy inaction.  And that is that the things that do not get done are often not premediated or 
strategic deliberate omission but rather more practical decisions relating to the legislative 
process.  Jill Rutter picks up the trail: 
 
There are limits to what government does, for instance we had this draft piece of 
legislation ready to go which we hoped ministers would want but it failed to make the 
cut on priorities for the legislative programme which is an example of when everybody 
agrees it's a sensible thing to do but while there's no downside, it's not quite enough of 
a priority. Government has a legislative capacity and you get that every time and you 
see it in the Bills put forward for the legislative programme that there will be some 
serial ones which come up time and time again as nice to do and sometimes they make 
it into the last session of a Parliament when nobody has very much to do.... So 
something that everyone agrees should be done, doesn't cut through or doesn't fit the 
themes even though there's no real active decision that we don't want to do it22. 
 
Perhaps the hyperactivity to which Gove refers is a case in point since the government to which 
he belonged engaged in a radical reorganisation of the Health service at a time when it was 
trying to curb public spending. According to analysis from the Heath Foundation and the 
Financial Times, the shake-up meant that hospital productivity ‘tumbled’ undermining 
policymakers’ desire to protect the NHS from budget cuts23. All this came on top of near 
constant reform during the previous governments led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown24.  
Might doing nothing have actually produced better outcomes?  
Before moving on to the examination of doing nothing or political inaction, this section 
acknowledges and categorises this phenomenon of doing too much.  It reflects on debates 
played out in sometimes disconnected existing research.  
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There is a longstanding, if limited, literature on ‘ministerial overload’; policymakers trying to do 
more than is possible without the space to reflect.   Some of this can be blamed on the 
permanent civil service and their desire to ‘keep their minister’ busy’. Margaret Hodge alludes 
to this from her own departmental experience: 
So what are the pressures? You would be surprised at how mundane it is and it depends 
where you are, it depends on the civil servants you’re working with, it depends on your 
own priorities.  There is a certain culture in the Civil Service which is about keeping 
junior ministers busy doing nothing – signing off PQs, signing off letters, doing the 
nothing, nothing jobs and if they can do that, no-one worries about policy.25 
 
Indeed didactically drawn from rational choice theory Anthony Downs’ much cited classic Inside 
Bureaucracy considers the manifestation of politicians who ‘go native’, behaving as advocates 
for their departments over their government or party26.   But more precisely overload is a 
systemic problem.  Former civil servant turned academic, David Laughrin, believes that 
‘government ministers are more likely to be subject to an unacceptable degree of overload 
than almost any other profession. Sadly, however, they, those who work for them and those 
they represent often do not recognise this until it is too late.  Overload matters because it can 
sometimes affect some leaders’ ability to think clearly and strategically and take good decisions 
on our behalf. It matters now because overload is getting worse’27. Former ministers frequently 
report working non-stop 16 hour days with diaries crammed full of meetings and engagements. 
‘Ministers not only live in a fishbowl, they also have to be adaptable. They move from meeting 
to meeting, engagement to engagement, and topic to topic with barely time to read, let alone 
digest, their briefing. The diversity can be breathtaking.’ 28 There remains a shortfall of 
knowledge about just what ministers do with their time and naturally experiences differ 
between holders of different posts in different administrations. It is possible to say, however, 
that the system requires a minister to head a department, develop policy, attend Cabinet and 
Cabinet Committees, advocate plans in government, parliament and in the country, act as a 
media spokesperson, be a party figure, represent their constituents and defend their 
parliamentary seat amongst other activities.  Marsh, Richards and Smith distilled these down to 
four key roles: policy, political, executive and public relations29. Of those pressures, Cheong 
argues that policy capacity is the most appropriate skill for ministerial success30 and this makes 
sense if one considers the purpose of forming a government.  However, in terms of overload 
and doing too much, accountability perhaps presents the greatest pressure. Laughrin identifies 
this as the pressure on ministers ‘of constantly having to explain what they are thinking and 
planning, sometimes before they have had time to think it through fully. Today that is often 
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under fierce daily or hourly questioning from media inquisitors… If this can be a strength in 
democratic terms, it is certainly an added stress factor in decision making’.31  
For this reason, in Britain’s Westminster system, a ‘good’ Minister is not one who displays 
expertise over the area for which his or her department has responsibility; Britain has rarely 
seen professional ministers appointed from outside of Parliament (though Gordon Brown 
engaged in a limited experiment after 2007)32.  Indeed in comparison to their European 
counterparts Blondel demonstrates that historically a British Minister is much less likely to be 
appointed to office because of their subject expertise33.  Rather, government Ministers are 
expected to have the requisite political skills34 to deal with competing ministerial colleagues, 
the confrontation of Parliament and an often hostile media.  In Whitehall, politicians are moved 
frequently from one department to another.  This is an observation long made from those who 
experienced it such as Richard Crossman35 and Nigel Lawson 36 and empirically by academics 
such as Valentine Herman37 or Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding38 who demonstrate that British 
ministers are likely to find themselves reshuffled with a degree of frequency and have 
historically held office for shorter periods than their international equivalents.   
Furthermore, the major motivation in conducting reshuffles is for Prime Ministers to exert 
power over government and consequently they ‘attach great importance to maximizing the 
political advantages to be gained from them. This factor is the chief determinant of their 
logistics.’39 The constraints of coalition after 2010 made reshuffles less likely since it diluted the 
power of patronage enjoyed by the prime minister.  That is, while the prime minister retains 
the right to appoint and dismiss Ministers, in coalition it can only be done within the framework 
of what has been agreed with the coalition partner. In this instance, that partner was the 
Liberal Democrats led by deputy prime minister Nick Clegg who enjoyed the right to be 
consulted on reshuffles and the right to appoint his own colleagues to particular posts40. This 
meant that constitutional arrangements were stretched while one major motivation for 
engaging in reshuffles, to assert prime ministerial authority, was weakened.  Nonetheless, it is 
perhaps the criticism of frequent reshuffles, where ministers are shifted before they can grasp 
their brief, which led Prime Minister Cameron to be rather reserved in moving ministers during 
2010-2015 engaging in only one minor set of changes in 2012 and a more comprehensive 
reshuffle in July 2014 to refresh his (Conservative) team ahead of the general election a year 
later (Liberal Democrat Ministers were left untouched). In his first majority government formed 
in May 2015, many of the portfolios and all of the top  ministries remained in the same hands 
with changes largely initiated by the departing Liberal Democrats 
Given Michael Gove’s boast, this would not have seemed to have curtailed overall government 
activity but in departments at least, there will have been greater continuity. Time will tell if 
successor premiers choose or are required to exert similar restraint.  While future prime 
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ministers might not move their ministers with the frequency of Tony Blair or Gordon Brown 
(who between them were responsible for five Secretaries of State for Defence between 2005 
and 2010), there seems every motivation to use this lever of power even if it means 
undermining ministerial responsibility, expertise, grasp of the brief or mastery of their 
departments.  
Aldrerman offers a spirited defence of frequent ministerial turnover. ‘Short-stay ministers’, he 
says, ‘can be much more positively characterized as active foreign bodies whose function is to 
produce creative friction’41.  He rejects the fear that politicians risk acting without mastering 
their brief with the counter-argument that by that time they have become creatures of their 
departments.  Furthermore while reshuffles can mean (unnecessary) shifts in policy at the 
whim of the new minister in charge, Prime Ministers can use the reorganisation to deliberately 
alter direction, tone or policy altogether.  Arguably this happened when David Cameron 
replaced controversial Health Secretary Andrew Lansley with the more low Key Jeremy Hunt in 
2012, neutralising somewhat the tensions which had resulted from NHS reform and the 
unpopular Health and Social Care Bill42.  A new minister can, therefore, change policy because 
of the ‘power of initiative’ even without the authority of expertise.  Alderman continues with 
the case that the ‘need to regularly freshen their administrations figures prominently in prime 
ministers’ calculations.  Leaving many ministers in the same posts for prolonged periods may 
convey the impression not of continuity and stability but rather, of immobilism’43. That is 
governments need to act and to be seen to be acting.   
Whether or not these arguments are considered convincing, they amount to a simple truth: it 
means ministers doing more not less.  There is a systemic motivation for a new minister to 
make their mark, push through a policy change, pilot a piece of legislation through Parliament, 
demonstrate their political skills to a prime minister capable of promoting them, safe in the 
knowledge they are unlikely to be in post to be held accountable for the consequences.  As 
Lilley puts it, ‘You’re more likely to be known for doing something than for doing nothing.  You 
might heroically have saved the nation from going down some dreadful path but because you 
haven’t gone down that path, no-one will know about it44.’   Margaret Hodge adds weight to 
this view with a subtle distinction between the short timespan in office and the ‘fear’ of being 
moved: 
There is this time imperative, the whole time – and I noticed this when I became Chair 
of PAC because I had five years allowing me to pace myself and do things in a much 
more rational way – but if you had a ministerial job under Blair/Brown, you had a year 
and you just had to get on with it and try to do as much as you could. And of course it all 
because very ephemeral; in a sense doing a lot meant we did nothing…. There is no 
assessment of your capability in a ministerial role – it’s another thing that’s wrong with 
17 
 
the system, there’s no support, no career development – you had no idea whether you 
were doing well or badly. Did that put pressure to act? I wouldn’t correlate it entirely 
but there was certainly nervousness about getting reshuffled out but pressure to act, 
not particularly. You kept thinking ‘I hope he thinks I’m competent’ but you had no 
idea.45   
 For Rhodes, an overriding observation was Ministers ‘concern with publicly visible performance 
and being seen to make a difference. Making a difference has distinct, if related, meanings. 
Obviously, it refers to legislation and policy that changes the lives of citizens. It also refers to 
the minister’s standing in the pecking order of the governing party. Ministers seek to be onside 
with the prime minister and the chancellor and look, first, to survive in the Cabinet and, second, 
to move to one of the great departments of state such as the Treasury or the Home Office.’46  
Partly because of the confrontational Westminster system, ministers are expected to act 
decisively.  There is very often little room for deliberation and Ministers who are seen to be 
inactive can expect to be ‘punished’ at reshuffles just as the legislative stars can expect 
promotion.  Budgets are naturally finite which means ministerial competition to ‘win’ resource 
for their department and the consequence of this is action. While it would be an exaggeration 
to suggest that policy objectives are absent from the motivation in attracting and spending 
public monies for ministers, sometimes the incentives can be more closely aligned with this 
inter-government ministerial competition.   
Moreover, politicians need to be seen to do something; whether it is dangerous dogs, which 
resulted in the classic piece of pointless legislation in 1991, floods which had every party leader 
wading through the countryside in wellington boots in 2013, or terrorism which after the US 
twin towers attack in 2001 saw an ineffective assault on civil liberties, getting to the heart of a 
complex problem is rarely as big a priority as being seen to take action.  Jill Rutter suggests 
much of the action is unnecessary from a policy perspective: 
 
You do quite a lot of things where you don’t need to do them.  For instance an awful lot 
of Home Office legislation, they never move the clauses to put it into law... The Home 
office legislates for a lot of new criminal offences which are completely covered by 
existing offences but is there because there’s quite a lot of gesture legislation.  So 
there’s quite a lot of things you do for the purpose of being seen to do something, 
signalling in legislation that this is now important but there’s no substantive change47.  
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The recently released files on 1980s football hooliganism is a case in point for they reveal this 
pressure to be seen to be taking action as a phenomenon which reaches the very top of 
government.  The explanations for football violence are complex and run deeper in society than 
the tribal support of a team.  There are studies on this48 and here is not the place for a 
discussion suffice that the focus of government surrounded simply tackling the manifestation of 
violence rather than the social root causes. In frenzied correspondence between the game’s 
governing body and government, the emphasis was firmly placed on visible changes around 
crowd control and banning the sale of alcohol in grounds. The systemic pressure is given away 
by a handwritten note on the subject dating from 1986.  Here Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher insisted that ‘we must press ahead and be seen to do so… I know we must not relax 
now. If we do, one more bad incident and we shall be culpable’49 
The manifestation is all too often the tool to hand for policymakers: legislation. The instinct to 
be seen to take action makes law irresistible even if new legislation is incapable of tackling the 
problem.  This was an issue which came to the fore as Tony Blair’s premiership neared its end.  
The Independent reported in 2006 that there had been ‘frenzied law making’ with ‘an offence 
for every day spent in office’.  As the report highlighted, the ‘3,000-plus offences have been 
driven on to the statute book by an administration that has faced repeated charges of meddling 
in the everyday lives of citizens, from restricting freedom of speech to planning to issue identity 
cards to all adults.’50 Sweet & Maxwell put this into some perspective when their analysis 
showed that the Blair government had enacted 11% more laws per year than the Major 
government which proceeded it and that the Major government itself introduced 39% more 
laws per year than the Thatcher government it replaced51.   But laws are not the only way to 
assess government action.  While the pace of new legislation slowed after 2010, government 
became interested in other ideas.  With the publication of Thaler and Sunstein’s popular book 
of the same title52 ‘nudge’ became rather attractive to policymakers existing in an environment 
where public funds were scarcer than before. The Behavioural Insight Unit was established 
within the Cabinet Office to explore these sorts of possibilities and is noteworthy for a study of 
‘do nothing’ politics.  Nudge perhaps represents the semblance of government inaction but still 
achieves policy change.  Rather than legislating or regulating activity this approach can subtly 
shift behaviour in people by adjusting the ‘information architecture’ but is judged by those 
citizens to be their own decisions.  Critics of the approach point out that ‘the extent that it 
lessons the control agents have over their own evaluations, shaping people’s choices for their 
own benefit seems to us to be alarmingly intrusive.’53  
The systemic problem in British politics is policymakers doing too much rather than too little.  
Indeed, there are very few structural incentives to do less or nothing.  This book explains this 
sensation but also shows how there can be power in policy inaction. Before that, a simple 
definition is required.  
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So what is Inaction and Why Study it? 
 
‘Do nothing’ politics has to mean the deliberate decision of policy makers not to take action and 
where there would have been the option to have done so.  
‘Initiativitus’ suggests that government should not always feel obliged to act and that ‘doing 
nothing’ can even produce better results.  A fuller appreciation of the pressures to act can help 
develop our understanding of the decision making process and ultimately improve policy.  
Furthermore, it stands to reason that in choosing how to use resources and in taking decisions, 
politicians are engaging in inaction; either in prioritisation (doing this means not doing that) or 
by more deliberate negative preference. Overload in itself means ministers are at capacity so 
some things cannot be done.  As Weller and Grattan point out in their seminal study of 
Australian government three decades ago: ‘Even working fifteen or more hours a day, choices 
have to be made; not everything can be done, not everyone can be seen.’54 Jill Rutter puts it as 
a series of questions, ‘How do you prioritise? You have a limited amount of time and political 
capital potentially a limited part of a programme and how do you deploy those limited bits of 
ministerial capital and how do you achieve a sufficiently sensible regime for everything else?55’ 
Do nothing politics should not be confused with the status quo.  Whether intentional or simply 
as a consequence, inaction does not mean that nothing changes.  Government is undertaken in 
a volatile environment.  However big a player in that environment, much of what politicians do 
represents reaction to changes in the world.  Inaction does not mean that those changes do not 
take place; indeed it can mean their effects are more pronounced.  Whether it is the economy, 
demographic changes, globalisation or natural phenomena, society is constantly changing and 
inaction can exacerbate that change.  
There is also the idea that the state can ‘crowd out’ and disincentivise action at society’s level.   
Following a decade of significant increases in public expenditure beginning in earnest in 2000, 
there were other motivations to political inaction than balancing the books.  The 2010 coalition 
came to power with a mission to reduce departmental spending overall and one way of 
mitigating the effects of less well funded public services was to look to society itself.   Jesse 
Norman sums it up in his defence of ‘Big Society’: ‘we have reached the limits of the idea of the 
state as a remedy for social and economic failure’, he says, ‘What is so striking is how 
impoverished political debate has become on these issues and how reliant we are on a single 
and inflexible model of state provision of public services to solve our social ills’56 State action 
and resource, he suggests, has been ineffective in tackling some of society’s social ills. But this 
does not mean it is a zero sum game.  That is, inaction might not have meant that outcomes did 
20 
 
not improve at all and might even have meant better outcomes.  The question for policymakers 
should be therefore: ‘will state action produce better outcomes than the market or civil society 
left to their own devices?’ Where the state claims a monopoly, near monopoly or controlling 
regulatory interest, whether that is in the form of healthcare, welfare, education, housing or 
any number of other areas of life, it can prevent non-state actor involvement or discretion.  If 
policy makers do nothing, there are circumstances where it can mean that other actors become 
energised.  
The decisions that politicians take in office are often important and the decision to do nothing 
can be as significant as the more obvious policy pronouncements, legislation and initiatives.  
Inaction is in part a necessary pre-condition of action, since doing one thing means not doing 
another.  Indeed, some inaction masquerades as small piecemeal change which has the power 
to prevent bigger transformations.  But the option to do nothing, where action is an option, can 
be meaningful and have long-lasting implications.  For this reason it is a worthy area of 
academic investigation.   
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